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The Missing Link in the Diffusion of Protest:
Asking Others1
Stefaan Walgrave and Ruud Wouters
University of Antwerp
Mobilization for protest is a process of diffusion in interpersonal net-
works. Extant work has found that being asked by people one knows
is a key determinant of participation, but the ﬂip side—asking others—
has been neglected. The authors examine which prospective partici-
pants are most likely to ask others to participate and whom they ask.
Drawing on a new and unusual data set including evidence on more
than 7,000 participants in 48 demonstrations across Europe, the au-
thors ﬁnd that activists who are committed to the demonstration’s
cause ðwilling to recruit othersÞ and who are part of participation-
friendly networks ðable to recruit othersÞ are the most active recruiters.
Asking others is dependent on being asked: participants tend to re-
cruit people similar to those who have recruited them and, most im-
portantly, participants who are recruited via strong ties are less active
recruiters themselves.
Sociologists have spent a lot of time understanding how interpersonal net-
works work and what the consequences of network membership for peo-
ple’s behavior are. The idea underlying the network approach is that hu-
man behavior is a consequence not so much of individuals’ attributes but
rather of the relation they hold with other individuals ðEmirbayer and
Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 1997Þ. Networks have been shown to affect
people’s lives and behavior in many domains ranging from ﬁnding jobs
1 Direct correspondence to Stefaan Walgrave, Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Antwerp, Stadscampus, S.M. 227, Sint Jacobstraat 2, 2000 Antwerpen, Bel-
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ðGranovetter 1973Þ, over buying certain products ðKempe, Kleinberg, and
Tardos 2005Þ, to joining religious groups ðSmilde 2005Þ. One of the most
important functions of social networks is that they offer potential channels
for the diffusion of innovation or behavior ðRogers 1962; Centola andMacy
2007Þ. Interconnected people tend to embrace similar innovations, and
they are more likely to be inﬂuenced by each other’s behavior than uncon-
nected people ðsee, e.g., Valente 1995Þ.
Within networks several diffusion mechanisms can be at work. For in-
stance, in a network people can simply observe each other’s behavior and
imitate what others are doing even without these others explicitly attempt-
ing to inﬂuence them. Smilde ð2005, p. 772Þ calls this the “modeling” effect of
networks ðKitts ½2000$ labels it the “information exposure effect” of social
networksÞ. Spatially close others are observed and can serve as a model for
one’s own behavior. By observing others in one’s network, people get a use-
ful cue to assess howmany people in the population will adopt the behavior,
and that affects the chance of embracing that behavior oneself ðsee, e.g.,
Marwell and Oliver 1993; Kim and Bearman 1997Þ. This emulative diffu-
sion is often not what networks facilitate most, though. Rather, interpersonal
networks increase the chance that explicit recommendations and referrals
to embrace a similar behavior, innovation, service, or product are made. The
key mechanism then is social conformity. When asked by individuals they
know, people change their behavior—they join a religion, adopt a certain
cultural taste, engage in an association—because they value the relationship
with the askers andwant to conform ðMarsden and Friedkin 1994Þ. Joining
reduces the dissonance in ðimportantÞ relationships ðSmilde 2005Þ.
The role of explicit recommendations or referrals in the diffusion of
behavior has been studied widely in many sociological subdisciplines. For
example, there is plenty of work in consumer behavior showing that rec-
ommendations by friends or acquaintances are strongly inﬂuential ðmuch
more inﬂuential than advertisements, for that matterÞ. Studies ﬁnd that
“word-of-mouth” referral is a powerful mechanism of product diffusion in
interpersonal networks ðsee, e.g., Brown and Reingen 1987; Duhan et al.
1997; Goldenberg, Libai, and Muller 2001; Kempe et al. 2005Þ.
The social movement subﬁeld was one of the ﬁrst to be affected by the
boom of network-based diffusion studies in sociology more generally. The
relational approach to social behavior was adopted swiftly by social move-
ment scholars ðEmirbayer and Goodwin 1994, pp. 1420–22Þ. What network
analysts call “diffusion”—the adoption of innovation and behavior—was
applied by social movement scholars to the process of “mobilization”—the
effort to convince potential participants to join a movement or collective
event. Mobilization is a broad process going beyond interpersonal recruit-
ment. It involves organizational efforts and mass media coverage, for ex-
ample. Yet, initiated by Snow, Zurcher, andEkland-Olson ð1980Þmore than
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30 years ago, students of social movements now widely consider mobiliza-
tion as a diffusion process primarily happening in interpersonal, social net-
works ðsee, among many others, McAdam 1986, 1988; Knoke 1990; Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Kitts 2000; Lim 2008Þ. Scholars agree that the
micro networks in which people are embedded are key in understanding
movement participation: “It is now common place to say that social con-
nections to people who are alreadymobilized are what draw new people into
protest movements, religious movements, and identity movements” ðGould
2003, p. 236Þ.
Diffusion of movement participation can occur through different mech-
anisms as well. Following Smilde’s ð2005Þ modeling mechanism, people in
a network can simply observe each other’s protest behavior and imitate it.
For the spread of protest, though, this emulative diffusion is less pertinent
since protest participation is often not directly observable and it is costly ðfor
a similar argument, see Lim ½2010, p. 343$Þ. Therefore, similarly to the studies
on consumer behavior ðe.g., Brown and Reingen 1987Þ or religious conver-
sion ðe.g., Stark 1996Þ, social movement scholars have resorted to studying
the explicit efforts at recruitment in social networks: the phenomenon of
being asked by people in one’s network to join and to adopt the same protest
behavior. There is now a substantive body of work on the effect of receiving
participation requests. It shows that protest behavior indeed passes via ex-
plicit recruiting efforts within networks; being asked by people one knows is
a strong predictor ofmovement participation ðsee, e.g., Schussman and Soule
2005Þ. Note that this literature, and this study as well, focuses on the re-
cruitment of others for the same protest event or movement, although, in
principle, people can ask others to join an event or movement in which they
are not participating themselves.
Social movement scholars have only partially assumed the relational ap-
proach championed by sociological network theorists. They extensively stud-
ied who is asked but failed entirely to account for the process of asking it-
self. Consequently, we know a good deal about being asked but much less
about the asking itself. We do not know to what extent and under which cir-
cumstances prospective activists pass on incoming participation appeals to
other potential participants.We also lack the most basic of knowledge about
whom prospective protesters tend to invite.
Following general network theory stating that people are nodes connect-
ing others ðWasserman and Faust 1994Þ, our basic claim in this article is that
people are mobilized by people they know and at the same time mobilize
other people they know. Participation requests are received and forwarded
in networks. Similar to the “cascades of recommendation” known to play a
role in the word-of-mouth diffusion of new products ðKempe et al. 2005Þ, the
contagious spread of a rumor onﬁrst hearing ðCentola andMacy 2007Þ or the
American Journal of Sociology
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cascading personal persuasion process in election campaigns ðHuckfeldt and
Sprague 1992Þ, we contend that potential activists act as both message re-
ceivers and message generators. Potential protesters are nodes in networks
connecting people and groups, and they process, ﬁlter, retain, or pass on mo-
bilizing information. If protesters were only mobilized while not mobiliz-
ing others in turn, mobilization would peter out quickly after one round of
asking and many possible participants would not be reached. Decisions to
participate in and adopt the protest behavior may spread through the net-
work from a small set of initial adopters to a possibly much larger group.
So, we argue in this article that, at least as important for the diffusion of
participation as being asked is the asking part. In line with Schussman and
Soule’s ð2005Þ contention that mobilization is a multistaged process, we hold
that a full account of how participation diffuses requires evidence not only
on being asked but also on asking others. While Schussman and Soule show
that being asked acts as an intermediary step, this article adds the next step
of mobilization: asking others. In short, the study represents a ﬁrst attempt
to shift attention to the “asking others” part in the diffusion of protest.
We engage in answering two research questions: ð1Þ which participants are
more likely than others to ask other people to participate, and ð2Þ whom do
they ask?
The article presents novel data—comparing across issues, movements,
and countries—on the microlevel mobilization process gathered through sur-
vey interviews of more than 7,000 participants in 48 protest demonstra-
tions ð2008–11Þ in seven European countries. We ﬁnd that motivation and
capacity determine to what extent prospective participants ask others to
participate. People who are committed to the demonstration’s cause and
more motivated to turn the demonstration into a success ðwilling to recruit
othersÞ and people who are part of participation-friendly networks ðable
to recruit othersÞ are more active recruiters than others. On top of the effect
of motivation and capacity, and more importantly, we ﬁnd that asking others
is dependent on being asked. By whom people are asked to take part affects
whom people themselves invite to join. More concretely, people who are
asked to participate by a close family member or friend ðstrong tieÞ tend to
pass on that invitation to fewer different people than people who are asked
to participate by someone they do not know well ðweak tieÞ. Especially par-
ticipants who have been asked by a member of an organization or by an ac-
quaintance ðweak tieÞ turn out to be the most active recruiters themselves.
These ﬁndings not only contribute to the speciﬁc study of recruitment
in social movements but speak to the wider sociological ﬁeld of social net-
works and diffusion. Although network theory considers people as network
nodes receiving and sending messages, it is striking to see that most work
on diffusion does not focus on the sending part but mainly on the receiving
Missing Link in the Diffusion of Protest
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part. Our observation that the relational approach has been only partly
embraced by the ﬁeld of social movements applies as well to the wider ﬁeld
of diffusion studies. Most diffusion work focuses on the receivers and deals
with the effectiveness of the ties they share with their senders. Hardly any
work has dealt with the senders of the signals or, in the words of this study,
with the recruiters. This predominant focus on the receiving side of commu-
nication in networks has inspired a good deal of criticism on social network
theory more generally ðsee, e.g., Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994Þ. Critics like
Gould ð2003Þ and Smilde ð2005, p. 758Þ argue that network analysts con-
sider human beings as “oversocialized” and that they conceptualize human
beings “as acted upon by networks rather than acting on them and through
them.” By focusing on the recruiters and not the recruits, and by showing
that recruiters’motivation and attitudes matter for their recruiting behavior,
the study provides an example of individuals’ agency within social networks.
Added to that, the research contributes to social network studies more
generally by explicitly tackling the role of networked individuals as nodes
of interaction. In fact, our most compelling ﬁnding is that whom people ask
to participate is affected by whom they were asked themselves; where the
call to arms comes from affects to whom the call to arms is forwarded. Our
ﬁndings put the crucial connecting role of individuals in social networks
center stage. It is by passing on information that individuals connect other
people and integrate groups.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ASKED
Why are social networks crucial for participation in social movements?
Apart from the emulative behavior throughmere observation, the prevalent
answer has been that network membership increases the chance that people
are asked to participate in collective action ðVerba et al. 1995Þ. Via their
personal relations, people are connected to opportunities for participation
offered by social movement organizations ðSMOsÞ. Students of social move-
ments have called this the “recruitment function” of social networks ðPassy
2001Þ. Of course, people come to know about an upcoming event via other
channels as well—via the mass media, for example, or via information they
directly get from an organization—but convincing and activating people to
participate, especially for relatively costly activities like participating in a
protest demonstration, mostly happen via direct interpersonal contact and
calls ðKlandermans andOegema 1987; Lim2010Þ. In their seminalVoice and
Equality, Verba et al. ð1995, p. 3Þ contend that there are three determinants
of political participation: being willing ðagreeing with the causeÞ, being able
ðhaving the necessary time and resourcesÞ, and being asked. They show that,
in the U.S. context, there is a substantial effect of being asked. When people
are asked, the odds of participation go up considerably: “Any attempt to
American Journal of Sociology
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understand the roots of participation must take into account the impact of
requests from others” ðVerba et al. 1995, p. 138Þ.
The idea that being asked is a strong predictor of participation has been
widely adopted and conﬁrmed by scholars studying social movements in-
volvement. McAdam and Paulsen ð1993, p. 647Þ, for example, in their model
of differential recruitment, state that for any participation the ﬁrst step is
that “the individual must be the object of a recruiting appeal.” Similarly,
Klandermans and Oegema ð1987Þ and Klandermans ð2004Þ state that only
individuals who are targeted by mobilization attempts eventually actually
participate ðsee also Snow et al. ½1980$ for an overview of the older literature
on the importance of networks formobilization andGould ½2003$Þ. Only Lim
ð2010Þ recently challenged the quasi consensus about the large effect of being
asked by showing that people who are asked to participate in protest are also
the ones who are most likely to participate, even when they would not have
been asked. As recruitment attempts are made selectively, Lim says, the net
causal effect of being asked to protest is signiﬁcant but smaller than estab-
lished by previous studies.
Probably the most systematic and direct study of the importance of being
asked has been done by Schussman and Soule ð2005Þ. Using the same U.S.
data set as Verba et al., Schussman and Soule directly measure whether in-
dividuals have been asked to participate and conﬁrm that “individuals rarely
participate in social movement activities ðsuch as protestÞ unless they are
asked to do so” ðp. 1086Þ. They nicely show that the variables that are tra-
ditionally expected to affect the odds of participation, most particularly or-
ganizational membership, exert only an indirect inﬂuence on effective par-
ticipation. Being a member of networks increases the chance of being asked,
but it does not directly affect the chance of participation, only indirectly via
the increased chance of being asked.
Extant work demonstrates that potential participants are mostly being
asked by people whom they know personally and who belong to their in-
terpersonal network. That is, being asked occurs in micro networks. There
still is some debate about what kind of network connection is most effective
in bringing about actual participation. Most scholars hold that strong ties
rather than weak ties are effective activators ðsee, e.g., Gerlach and Hine
1970;McAdam1986;Klandermans andOegema 1987;McAdamandPaulsen
1993; Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Passy 2001; Somma 2009Þ. Passy ð2001Þ, for
example, argues that strong ties, loadedwith trust and familiarity, reduce the
uncertainty of participation so that the level of the subsequent activism goes
up ðfor a similar argument in the ﬁeld of product recommendations, see
Brown andReingen ½1987$Þ. But Lim ð2008Þ recently argued that the strength
of the tie between a recruiter and potential recruits in itself does not affect
the odds of participation. Rather it is a matter of the connection being em-
bedded in an associational network that leads to participation. Fisher ð2010Þ,
Missing Link in the Diffusion of Protest
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in her pairwise comparison of the ties of participants in large events in the
United States and France, made a similar argument when ﬁnding that as-
sociational ties rather than ðstrongerÞ personal ties do seem to matter in
informing protesters about the protest ðsee also Fisher and Boekkooi 2010Þ.
The short overviewmakes it clear that we knowquite a bit about whether,
by whom, and with what effect potential participants are being asked to
participate. The scope of the available evidence, however, remains limited.
Six of the studies cited above rely on the same study used by Verba et al.
ð1995Þ, the U.S. 1990 Civic Participation Study ðBrady, Schlozman, and
Verba 1999; Schussman and Soule 2005; Lim 2008, 2010; Somma 2009Þ.2
Strikingly, though, why potential participants in turn ask other potential re-
cruits, and whom, still is left unexplored.We are not aware of any study that
empirically considers the “asking others” behavior of prospective partici-
pants by directly measuring recruiters’ behavior ðsee Gould ½2003$ for a the-
oretical accountÞ. The foundational studies of Verba et al. provide only indi-
rect information about who asks others to participate. Their information is
collected via questioning people who have been asked rather than via direct
surveys of the askers themselves ðVerba et al. 1995; Brady et al. 1999; see
also Lim ½2010$, who draws on the same data setÞ. This look at the recruiters
through the eyes of their recruits yields only scant and indirect evidence on
the recruiters. These scholars lack data, for example, about the motives of the
recruiters and rely on imputed preferences.
If being asked is such an important precondition for participation, then
the asking of others deserves full attention. For each participant who is being
asked, there is logically another participant who made the request. Students
of social movements have studied only half of the interpersonal diffusion of
the protest process, namely, the receptive part. They have ignored the initi-
ating part. If peoplewere only asked and never passed on these invitations to
participate to others,mobilizationwould be short-winded andwould never be
able to reach out beyond the directly and formally embedded constituency.
Yet, we know for a fact that this is not the case.Mobilization sometimes does
spread through networks as a wildﬁre jumping from one network to another,
and very often mobilization does not remain conﬁned to one wave but pro-
ceeds in ongoing chains of being asked and asking. Without this contagion
process, large gatherings would be impossible as only movement members
and their direct contacts would be reached. Tomobilize widely, social move-
ments not only need formal channels for “en bloc recruitment” ðOberschall
1973Þ but also need to rely on their members to bring the message across to
2There are a larger number of studies drawing on evidence about “how people heard”
about an upcoming protest event ðBédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004; Fisher
2010; Fisher and Boekkooi 2010Þ, but we consider hearing about and being asked as
analytically different things. The ﬁrst just entails the, maybe unintended, dissemination
of information, while the second implies an active effort to recruit.
American Journal of Sociology
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other groups and nonmembers. Members are the rank-and-ﬁle marketers of
SMOs. In the next section we theorize about what makes prospective par-
ticipants likely to invite other people and about whom they ask.
WHO ASKS WHOM
Our account of asking others draws on three general propositions. Asking
others is determined by motivation, capacity, and compatibility. The ﬁrst
proposition builds on the straightforward idea that asking others to partici-
pate is sticking your neck out. By asking others, one publicly displays en-
dorsement of a cause and comes out as a supporter of a movement. Not all
targets of a recruiter may react positively: some may disagree with the cause,
some may change their opinion about the recruiter accordingly, or some
may even react in a hostile way. So, asking others comes with a cost, and not
all potential participants are prepared to bear that cost. It depends on the
motivation of the potential recruiter.
Second, not only should prospective participants bewilling to bear the cost
and risk of recruiting, but they need to be able to ask others. Capacity is the
second determinant of asking others. It comes in different guises. To start
with, not every potential activist has the same number of connections with
others, enabling him to ask others to participate. The more connections one
has, the higher one’s potential of asking others. Also, recruiters are not very
likely to put much effort into mobilizing others who may not be willing to
participate anyway. Brady et al. ð1999, p. 154Þ speak of recruiters as “ra-
tional prospectors” trying to optimize their recruitment efforts ðsee also Lim
2010Þ. Whether recruiters can single out other potential participants who
are willing to participate depends on the information they have about the
background, previous participation, attitudes, and preferences of potential
recruits. Lim ð2010, p. 343Þ states that “facing high uncertainty, the re-
cruiters may turn to the people whose political interests and orientations
are more visible.” Hence, information as well affects a prospective partic-
ipant’s capacity to recruit. This information is, among others, generated by
political interactions with others ðLim 2008Þ.
Third, invitations to others are not independent of the participation in-
vitations received from others. Inviting others is consequential. One of the
potential consequences of being asked and of asking others is that the re-
cruiter and his or her recruits attend the event together. Indeed, when people
personally ask others to take part in a protest event, they most likely ask to
join them and to attend the event together. Participation in protest is es-
sentially a social phenomenon: very few people attend protest events on their
own.Most are accompanied by friends, family, colleagues, and so forth.When
asking other people to participate, in many cases the asker is looking for
company to attend the event with. This implies that passing on an invitation
Missing Link in the Diffusion of Protest
1677
This content downloaded from 137.204.1.40 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014 17:50:51 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
to participate will be targeted speciﬁcally to those others who are “socially
compatible”with a participant’s own recruiter. In order to avoid being stuck
at the protest event with a heterogeneous company of people who do not
match, prospective participants tend to recruit people who know their own
recruiter or who will at least ﬁt their own recruiter socially. Our compati-
bility proposition draws on the more general ﬁnding in network studies that
similarity breeds connection. Many homophily studies have shown that
similar people tend to associate and bond. Sharing common characteristics
makes communication and relationship formation easier ðMcPherson, Smith-
Lovin, and Cook 2001Þ. Hence we assume that asking others is determined
by being asked because of the aimed-for similarity or compatibility between
the recruiter and the recruit.
Ironically, the presented account of asking others thus boils down to a
statement that is almost identical with Verba et al.’s ð1995, p. 3Þ famous
quote about participation in political activities itself: prospective partici-
pants solicit others to participate because they want ðhere: motivationÞ,
because they can ðhere: capacityÞ, and because they are being asked ðhere:
compatibilityÞ. On the basis of these three general principles, we formulate
six hypotheses on who asks whom.
Some activists are more committed to a cause and more motivated to take
part in protest actions than others. This strong motivation results in a larger
willingness to mobilize others. Highly motivated activists are more eager to
turn the protest into a success; the more people they ask, the more people will
probably attend and the larger the potential impact of the event. Owing to
their high motivation, these activists are more prepared to run the risk/bear
the cost of being ignored, laughed at, attacked, stigmatized, and so forth by
their recruitment targets or bystanders.Added to that,motivated activists are
more likely than less motivated ones to know more other potentially willing
activists. So, having more suitable potential targets, they have more chances
of being successful recruiters ðsee Verba et al. ½1995$ for a discussion of the
causal order between motivation and recruitmentÞ. Hence our motivation
hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1.—More motivated participants are more active recruiters than
less motivated participants.
Some prospective activists know a lot of other people who may be willing
to join; others may not. Knowing a lot of people who may be willing to join
consists of two things: knowing a lot of people and knowing that they may
be willing to join. Hence, recruitment ability has a structural embeddedness
aspect and an aspect of being informed about the preferences, political atti-
tudes, and past political behavior of others. In operational terms, both aspects
are merged in associational networks. More than potential activists without
associational connections, prospective activists embedded in associations know
a larger number of other people. Also, associationally embedded activists
American Journal of Sociology
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have more information about the political stances and protest willingness of
others as political issues are a frequent topic of discussion in associations.
This leads to a ﬁrst capacity hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2.—More associationally embedded participants are more active
recruiters than less associationally embedded participants.
The capacity to recruit others does not depend only on associational em-
beddedness. Some people talk a lot about politics with others while others do
not. If you interact frequently about politics with friends, relatives, or col-
leagues, the likelihood increases that you know others ðyour collocutorsÞ
who share the same cause as you and who would be willing to join. Talk-
ing politics does not increase your chance of knowing many people, but it
increases the chances of knowing the politics of the people around you and
making selective participation requests. Hence our second capacity hypoth-
esis:
HYPOTHESIS 3.—Participants who discuss politics more frequently are more
active recruiters than participants who talk less about politics.
If it is true that participants do not like their recruitment efforts to be in
vain and avoid being confronted with negative or hostile reactions of oth-
ers, we expect them to mainly target those other people of whom they ex-
pect the highest success rate ðBrady et al. 1999; Lim 2010Þ. Again, this is a
matter of information about the political beliefs, attitudes, and behavior
of potential recruits. The amount of information one has about a potential
recruit is a matter of the strength of the tie the potential recruiter has with
his potential recruit ðGranovetter 1973Þ. By having a strong tie with an-
other person, for example, a close friend, one probably knows the political
predispositions of this other person; but one also knows that asking this
close person will, on average, result in a higher success chance than ask-
ing a person with whom one has a less close tie ðfor a similar argument ap-
plied to consumer referrals, see Brown and Reingen ½1987$Þ. Hence, in line
with what has been found regarding the effect of being asked on effective
participation—although not all authors fully agree—we argue that strong
ties lead to more compelling and more difﬁcult to ignore appeals to par-
ticipate. It is more difﬁcult to refuse a favor to a close friend than it is to a
distant acquaintance ðGould 2003, p. 241Þ. Brady et al. ð1999, p. 155Þ speak
of the leverage a recruiter has on his or her recruit due to the social con-
formity pressure mentioned earlier: “Since the desire to please, or not to of-
fend, cements social relationships, friends also command a kind of lever-
age. Focussing on targets to whom they are close is an efﬁcient strategy for
rational prospectors.” Added to that, the chance of getting disagreeable re-
actions is smaller since potential close tie targets are not willing to imperil
a close relationship by reacting in a hostile way ðGould 2003Þ. Note that
one could also argue the opposite, namely, that refusing to accept an in-
vitation to participate will not really bother a strong tie inviter—they have
Missing Link in the Diffusion of Protest
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a strong bond and their relationship will be enduring anyway—while it
may be more offensive for a weak tie inviter. Still, we think that when re-
cruiting a strong tie relationship, the success chance is higher and the hos-
tility risk smaller. Added to that, the simple fact that strong ties are more
available and result in more frequent interaction via which referrals may be
made ðBrown and Reingen 1987, p. 353Þ reinforces the expectation that
strong ties will be activated more often for recruitment than weak ties and
that people mainly recruit in their inner circle. This leads to the privatization
hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4.—Participants tend more frequently to recruit people with
whom they have strong ties than people with whom they share weak ties.
The asking behavior of soon-to-be participants is also affected by the
kind of people the recruiters themselves have been invited by. Invitations
to join are primarily passed on to those others who are similar to one’s own
recruiters ðhomophilyÞ. Following the compatibility proposition, asking
others mirrors being asked. For example, people who are asked by friends
are predominantly asking other friends rather than, for instance, relatives
or close family members. People try to avoid mixing their different social
circles when protesting as this may make the actual participation with all
those different groups at the same time socially complicated. Note that there
may be an alternative and noncausal explanation leading to the same mir-
roring prediction. Some people may be heavily embedded in weak tie net-
works while others are situated in strong tie networks populated by numer-
ous family members and friends. These network characteristics can lead to
mirroring—people are asking the same kind of people they are asked by—
without there being a causal relation between being asked and asking but
simply as a consequence of their network composition ðthe availability of
tiesÞ. We cannot exclude this alternative account as we have no measure of
the attributes of the network the respondents are embedded in. Our mir-
roring hypothesis holds:
HYPOTHESIS 5.—Participants tend to ask potential recruits resembling their
own recruiters.
Being asked affects asking others in a second way as well. Most, but not
all, research on being asked found that the more dense, strong, and primary
the relationship between recruiter and recruit, the larger the chance that re-
cruits participate and themore committed theywill be ðMcAdamandPaulsen
1993; Passy 2001; but see Lim 2008; Fisher 2010Þ. This seems to go against
Granovetter’s ð1973Þ initial idea that weak ties are more important than
strong ties for recruitment ðbut see Granovetter 1978Þ. However, the present
study does not deal with a recruit’s own recruitment but with a recruit’s own
efforts at recruiting others. We expect recruitment via strong or weak ties to
play a different role in the subsequent recruitment requests the former re-
American Journal of Sociology
1680
This content downloaded from 137.204.1.40 on Sun, 16 Nov 2014 17:50:51 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
cruit makes: being asked to participate by someone with whom one has a
strong personal connection reduces the chance that one will become an active
recruiter compared to when one would have been asked by someone with
whom one shares a weak tie relationship. We have two reasons to expect this
pattern: the ﬁrst deals with the nature of strong and weak tie information,
the other with the social needs of the recruited.
First, we contend that participation invitations by a distant source are
easier to redirect to a wide variety of potential participants—including other
weak tie contacts but strong tie connections as well—than invitations from a
close and intimate origin. It is easier to privatize ðsee hypothesis 4 aboveÞ
invitations provided by strangers to primary contacts than it is to “publicize”
information generated by close people to more distant contacts whom one
may not know very well and with whom one does not have a trusting or
caring relationship. The reason is that the information and requests being
shared in primary relationships are more intimate and require more trust—
this is what the original deﬁnition of strong ties is about ðGranovetter 1973,
p. 1361Þ—making it less likely that it spills out of the primary inner circle to
reach more different people. The information and the requests being shared
with secondary relationships, in contrast, are more factual, are less loaded
with mutual trust and intimacy, and can thus more easily be passed on to
anyone, to members of one’s inner circle, and to outsiders. In other words,
information coming in from weak ties is more versatile, more ready to use,
and applicable to more different kinds of people than information from
strong ties. As a consequence, on average, weak tie information is passed on
more frequently than strong tie information. This ﬁrst mechanism does not
imply that weak tie information has more activation potential, nor that weak
tie information is somehow more compelling. It only means that strong tie
information is less ﬁt for further distribution and has a tendency to lead to
deactivation and not passing on the information to others. Weak tie de-
mands, in contrast, are less constrained. They can more easily be ampliﬁed
and broadened by sending out participation requests to more different kinds
of contacts.
Second, our compatibility proposition held that prospective participants
ask others to participate in their company. If we accept that individuals like
the company of people with whom they hold primary relationships, then the
chances are smaller that participation requests from primary contacts would
be passed on. If you are asked to participate by someone and plan to do so
with that person whom you know very well, why would you still ask other
people to join?You already have found good companionship and are socially
“satisﬁed.” There is no need to go on asking and searching for better com-
pany. This corresponds with our privatization hypothesis stating that people
in the ﬁrst place ask their nears to participate. In contrast, potential partic-
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ipants being asked by weak ties are not socially constrained to keep on re-
cruiting since they have not found the best possible company yet. So, again, it
is not the case thatweak tie recruitment increases the urge to go on recruiting,
but rather that strong ties decrease the need for ﬁnding other and better
company. All this leads to the deactivation hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 6.—Being asked by a strong tie relation leads to less active re-
cruitment than being asked by a weak tie relation.
DATA AND METHODS
Data come from the project “Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing
Contestation.”3 This project gathers ongoing, systematic data on protest par-
ticipants in seven European countries ðBelgium, Italy, Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, and SwitzerlandÞ. The protest survey methodol-
ogy of sampling and questioning participants in protest events was used to
survey 7,490 participants in 48 protest demonstrations that took place be-
tween 2009 and 2011 ðfor more methodological background about protest
surveying, seeWalgraveand Verhulst ½2011$Þ. In particular, all cooperating
country teams used the same methodology of selecting and interviewing pro-
test participants by means of pointers and interviewers in order to obtain a
random sample of demonstration participants. Pointers are senior research-
ers who, on the basis of the estimated size of the demonstration, systemati-
cally count and skip rows and indicate which particular protester in the mid-
dle, left, or right side of anNth row should be handed a postal questionnaire
ðbooklet of 8 A5 pagesÞ. For each demonstration, one pointer with a group of
interviewers starts at the head and one at the tail of the demonstration. Sam-
pling ðpointersÞ and interviewing ðinterviewersÞ are disconnected as inter-
viewers, if let free, tend to select approachable peers, causing selection bias.
Protesters ﬁll in the questionnaire at home and mail it back ðpostpaid en-
velopeÞ. For each demonstration, the aim was to distribute 1,000 question-
naires ð800 postal-only questionnaires, 200 including a face-to-face inter-
viewÞ.
Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the evidence, presenting infor-
mation on the number of demonstrators, distributed questionnaires, sent
back questionnaires, and useful questionnaires due to missing variables.
3Contextualizing Contestation is a project granted by the European Science Foundation
under grant 08-ECRP-001 and funded by the National Science Foundations of the
Netherlands ðBert KlandermansÞ, Belgium ðStefaan WalgraveÞ, Italy ðDonatella della
PortaÞ, Sweden ðAbby PetersonÞ, Spain ðJosé Manuel Sabucede Cameselle and Eva
AnduizaÞ, the United Kingdom ðChristopher Rootes and Clare SaundersÞ, and Swit-
zerland ðMarco GiugniÞ. Information on the project is available at http://www.protest
survey.eu ðproject proposal, manual for data collection, etc.Þ. SeeMobilization ðvol. 17,
no. 3Þ for an introduction to project framework, design, and data.
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Demonstrations did not yield equal numbers of completed questionnaires;
we count an average of 156 fully completed interviews per demonstration.
Average response rate is 32%. Analysis shows response bias to be minimal
and limited to age and education, usual suspects when it comes to response
bias. We do not weigh the data for sample size or for country. The data set
includes 11 demonstrations in Spain, 10 in the United Kingdom, 8 in the
Netherlands, 7 in Belgium, 5 in Sweden, 4 in Italy, 2 in Switzerland, and
one in Denmark. The largest group of demonstrations ðlabeled “austerity” in
table A1Þ concern budget cuts and austerity measures and are related to
the banking crisis and European budget regulations ðN5 18Þ. Then follow
a number of May Day events ðN 5 11Þ. Next are demonstrations dealing
with climate change or with the energy issue ðN 5 7Þ; events related to
nationalism, regionalism, or the reform of the state ðlabeled “state reform”;
N5 6Þ; antiracist or antifascist events ðN5 3Þ; women demonstrations ðN
5 2Þ; and, ﬁnally, a single ðN 5 1Þ antiabortion event.
The sample of demonstrations is not a perfectly representative sample of
all the demonstrations occurring in the countries during the 2009–11 pe-
riod, but it forms a good sample of the larger demonstrations. Each research
team in each country kept a close eye on upcoming protest events ðe.g., via
regular contacts with SMOs and police and via daily scrutiny of the mediaÞ
and was ready to go into the ﬁeld as soon as a major event was announced.
As a consequence, in most countries, all large protest events in the research
period were covered. The selected demonstrations display a large variety of
causes, issues, and movements. The evidence presents a tough test for any
general pattern of asking others.
Our design draws on actual participants only and does not include
nonparticipants. Thus, we cannot tell whether people would not have shown
up if ð1Þ they had not been asked or ð2Þ if they had been asked by other
people than actually asked them. But that is not our aim. Previous work
has already dealt with the effectivity of being asked and substantiated that
being asked is important for effective participation. If we assume that pro-
spective participants start asking other people only when they have decided
to attend the event themselves, the self-selection problem of having only ef-
fective participants is less of an issue for studying the second step in the
diffusion of protest. Indeed, it is likely that asking others is mainly done by
people who effectively attend themselves. Obviously, this assumption does
not always hold. Peoplewho plan to attend and have asked other peoplemay
not show up eventually because they have been prevented from attending
for practical reasons. Also, individuals may ask other people even if they are
unsure about their own participation; in fact, their effective participation
may even depend on the ðpositiveÞ response of the people they asked. Still, it
is plausible that a large majority of the people who ask other people to par-
ticipate in a protest event are planning to participate themselves ðand do
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eventually show upÞ. Some selection bias remains as some asking of others
is done outside the pool of effective participants, but we contend that it is
small. If it is true that most participation requests are made by people who
are committed to participating themselves, it makes sense to start tackling
the asking others puzzle drawing on a sample of participants only.
Each of the 48 demonstrations was surveyed using an identical ques-
tionnaire. It contained a question about asking others and an identical one
about being asked; these questions form the key variables of the article.
After asking the respondents by whom they had been asked to participate,
they were asked, “Which people did you yourself ask to participate?” fol-
lowed by seven closed answer categories of which people could mark as
many as applied: ð1Þ no one, ð2Þ partner or family, ð3Þ friends, ð4Þ relatives,
ð5Þ acquaintances, ð6Þ colleagues/fellow students, and ð7Þ comembers of an
organization of which I am a member. The preceding question about being
asked presented identical answer categories.
Recruitment intensity/diversity.—The asking others question was turned
into an interval scale measuring the intensity of recruitment—an additive
scale counting up the number of different types of other people a participant
had asked to participate, not including the no one category in the arithmetic
ð0–6Þ. Note that this compound scale taps not only the intensity but also the
diversity of a participant’s recruitment efforts. We do not know how many
different individuals a participant actually asked; we have information only
about the number of categories of people he or she asked. If people asked ﬁve
friends, for example, they score 1 on the intensity scale while those asking
one friend and one relative would score 2. Still, we hold that the number of
different categories of people one recruits forms an indicator of the efforts
one undertakes to spread the protest message. The diversity of recruitment is
part of the measure as well.We argued earlier that protest can spreadwidely
only if the call to arms is transferred across the boundaries of segmented
networks. The more diverse the people recruited, the higher the chance that
protest diffuses broadly. Hence, our compound measure taps both intensity
and diversity. In the remainder of the article, we will therefore refer to it as
“recruitment intensity/diversity.” Table 1 presents its distribution and de-
scriptives. The measure is a count measure with a similar mean and vari-
ance. This requires in principle a Poisson model. We ran all analyses with
Poisson models but report linear models since their results are easier to
interpret. The results are the same.
Tie strength.—The being asked question was converted into a scale mea-
suring the strength of the tie between the recruiter and the recruit. Measur-
ing the strength of ties is not an easy task. Strong ties are characterized by a
large amount of time spent together, a strong emotional intensity, the in-
timacy of the interactions, and a high reciprocity of the services rendered
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ðGranovetter 1973, p. 1361Þ. Ties and their strength are multidimensional
and depend on the frequency of contact, emotional closeness, commitment,
durability, and so forth ðMarsden and Campbell 2012Þ. We did not ask the
respondents any additional questions about, for example, their precise re-
lationship with the acquaintances they had been asked by or about what
kind of relatives recruited them ðsee also, e.g., Brown and Reingen 1987,
p. 356Þ. To make things more complicated, the strength of a relationship can
be issue dependent. In professional matters, for instance, it may be colleagues
and coworkers who form a person’s most important ties while in most other
matters it would probably be close family or friends ðsee, e.g., the study by
Wellman andWortley ½1990$ showing that the support function of ties varies
across domainsÞ. Since the demonstrations we surveyed cover a wide range
of issues in different spheres of life ðe.g., layoffs vs. abortionÞ, devising a uni-
ﬁed scale must be done with caution. First, we dropped the asked by no one
category; in the absence of a tie we cannot assess its strength. This decision
reduces the number of cases for the analyses with tie strength as an inde-
pendent variable. Since they were offered an explicit no one option, respon-
dents who did not mark any of the answer categories were considered as
missing for the strength of tie variable. We propose that partner/family ð5 5Þ
TABLE 1
Distribution and Descriptives of Key Variables
Frequency %
Recruitment Intensity/Diversity:
Number of people ðcategories askedÞ:
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,150 26.0
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,523 34.5
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 18.4
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461 10.4
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 5.7
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 3.4
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 1.5
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,417 100.0
Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.52
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.43
Asked by . . .: Tie Strength ðWeak-StrongÞ:
Comembers/acquaintances 5 1 . . . . 2,351 53.2
Relatives 5 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 4.8
Colleagues/fellow students 5 3 . . . . 476 10.8
Friends 5 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799 18.1
Partner/family 5 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579 13.1
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,417 100.00
Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.33
SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.56
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forms on average the strongest tie followed by friends ð5 4Þ. Owing to the
high frequency of ðdailyÞ interaction, we consider ties with colleagues/fellow
students as a middle category ð5 3Þ followed by relatives ð5 2Þ with whom
people most likely have less frequent interaction ðbut maybe more intimate
relationshipsÞ. Finally, we collapse the two weakest ties in a single weak tie
category consisting of comembers and acquaintances with arguably both a
low frequency and intimacy ð5 1Þ. We recoded the multiple response—peo-
ple could mark several answers—in such a way that a weak tie gets priority
over a stronger tie. For example, when a person says he has been asked by
friends ð5 4Þ and by acquaintances ð5 1Þ, we give that person a 1. Since it
is tricky to scale the seven categories into a single strong-weak tie variable
without additional information, in the results section, we run additional
analyses to test for the linearity of the effect of the strength of ties with all
ﬁve tie categories as separate ðdummyÞ variables. Table 1 contains the fre-
quency distribution and the descriptives of tie strength.
Motivation.—Motivation is measured by three questions. ð1Þ Motiva-
tional strength: How determined were you to participate in the demonstra-
tion? Answers ranged from “not very” ð5 1Þ to “very much” ð5 5Þ. ð2Þ Par-
ticipation decision timing:When did youmake a ﬁrm decision to participate
in the demonstration? Answer categories ranged from “the day of the dem-
onstration” ð5 1Þ to “over a month ago” ð5 5Þ. ð3Þ Organizing SMO iden-
tiﬁcation: To what extent do you identify with any organization staging the
demonstration? Answer categories ranged from “not at all” ð5 1Þ to “very
much” ð5 5Þ. These three constructs correlate to some extent—with the
highest Pearson’s r 5 .47 for motivational strength and participation deci-
sion timing—but not to the extent that multicollinearity is an issue when
incorporating them in the same model. An explicit test showed that collin-
earity was no issue. In fact, the highest variance inﬂation factor ðVIFÞ was
1.70, way below the threshold of a VIF value of 10. A correlation matrix of
all variables in the study can be found in table A3 in the appendix.
Capacity.—Capacity is assessed by three measures as well. ð1Þ Associa-
tional membership: If you have been involved in any of the following types
of organizations in the past 12 months, please indicate whether you are a
passive member or an active member. If you are a member of several orga-
nizations of the same type, mark the highest or most “active” category. A list
of 13 types of organizations that could be marked followed. We made an
additive scale of all memberships whereby passive ðand ﬁnancialÞ member-
ship counts for 1 andactivemembership counts for 2.The resulting scale runs
from 0 to 26. ð2Þ Organizational involvement: During the last 12 months, in
how many different organizations have you actively participated? Answer
categories ranged from “none” ð5 1Þ to “more than three” ð5 4Þ. ð3Þ Talk-
ing politics: When you get together with your friends, relatives, or fellow
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workers, how often do you discuss politics? Answer categories ranged from
“never” ð5 1Þ to “very often” ð5 5Þ. Note that talking politics could also be
considered as a measure of motivation instead of capacity.
Question wording and answer categories of all other variables and con-
trols ðdemographics, general political attitudes, and past political behav-
iorÞ as well as their descriptives are presented in table A2 in the appendix.
ANALYSIS
Most hypotheses can be tested with the intensity/diversity of a prospective
participant’s recruitment efforts as the dependent variable. Since the in-
dividual observations are clustered in demonstrations, we use a multilevel
linear regression model with individuals as level 1 and demonstrations as
level 2 observations; such a model accounts for systematic variation be-
tween the 48 demonstrations in our sample. Results testing the ﬁrst mo-
tivation hypothesis are presented in model 1 of table 2.
Hypothesis 1 stated that highly motivated participants would be more
willing to bear the cost of asking others and running the risk of being ig-
nored or getting negative reactions. Model 1 in table 2 contains the three
variables tapping motivation as well as the sociodemographic variables
and a number of controls. All three motivation measures are signiﬁcant
predictors of recruitment intensity/diversity. Participants who said they
identify strongly with one of the organizations staging the event ðorganiz-
ing SMO identiﬁcationÞ are more frequent recruiters but only marginally
so ðP 5 .041; the effect later vanishes in model 3Þ. People who said they
were more determined to participate ðmotivational strengthÞ and who de-
cided early ðparticipation decision timingÞ are more active recruiters as
well. Participation decision timing indicates motivation—highly motivated
people decide earlier—but it also measures something else. People who make
up their mind long before the demonstration have more time to ask others to
participate ðwhich actually is capacity and not motivationÞ. Imagine a par-
ticipant who decides the day of the demonstration itself that he will take
part in it; he then has very little time to approach others to join. By and
large, we can conclude that more motivated people pass on more requests
to join than less motivated people. Hypothesis 1 gets support.
Hypothesis 2 stated that recruitment efforts are a function of the capacity
of a participant to recruit others. Knowing a lot of people and having in-
formation about the politics of these people increases the chance of being
an active recruiter. Two variables in model 2 tap structural embeddedness
and thus capacity: the number of associational memberships ðassociation
membershipÞ and the number of organizations one was actively involved in
during the last 12 months ðorganizational involvementÞ. Both are signiﬁcant
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TABLE 2
Multilevel Regression: Recruitment Intensity/Diversity the Dependent Variable with Tie Strength Scale
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P
Motivation:
Motivational strength ðweak-strong; 1–5Þ . . . . . . . .299 .029 .000 .279 .028 .000
Participation decision timing ðlate-early; 1–4Þ . . . . .286 .025 .000 .247 .024 .000
Organizing SMO identiﬁcation ðlow-high; 1–5Þ . . . .045 .022 .041 .018 .022 .421
Capacity:
Association membership ðweighed number; 0–26Þ . . . . .049 .008 .000 .045 .007 .000
Organizational involvement ðfrequency; 0–4Þ . . . . .133 .027 .000 .058 .026 .025
Talking politics ðfrequency; 1–5Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 .030 .000 .113 .029 .000
Being asked:
Asked by . . . tie strength ðweak-strong; 1–5Þ . . . . 2.143 .014 .000
Sociodemographics:
Sex ðfemaleÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .051 .041 .208 .104 .042 .013 .062 .040 .120
Age ðyear bornÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .018 .001 .000 .017 .001 .000 .019 .001 .000
Education ðlow-high; 1–8Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .053 .014 .000 .019 .014 .189 .045 .013 .001
Employment ðfull-time; no-yesÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.043 .041 .300 2.021 .043 .623 2.031 .040 .450
Controls:
Organizing SMO membership ðno-yesÞ . . . . . . . . . .247 .048 .000 .365 .047 .000 .061 .049 .211
Demonstration participation frequency
ðlow-high; 1–5Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .194 .032 .000 .190 .034 .000 .096 .032 .003
Political interest ðlow-high; 1–4Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .075 .031 .016 .043 .036 .239 2.041 .035 .236
Left/right self-placement ðleft-right; 0–10Þ . . . . . . . 2.025 .011 .026 2.038 .012 .001 2.024 .011 .028
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237.235 2.746 .000 233.357 2.824 .000 239.352 2.693 .000
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,405.508 27,546.5104 27,310.5789
NOTE.—N demonstrations 5 48; N demonstrators 5 4,417; log likelihood null model 5 27,782.4886.
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predictors of recruitment intensity/diversity. Hypothesis 2 can bemaintained.
The more connected prospective participants are with others who may be
“mobilizable,” the more actively they recruit.
Hypothesis 3 held that the capacity to recruit depends on political in-
teractions with other people. If one talks frequently with others about
politics, one is better informed about the political convictions of these oth-
ers and can gauge the odds whether they would participate if asked. In
other words, to ask one must talk. The evidence corroborates hypothesis 3.
The coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant. Talking politics leads to inviting
others to take part in politics. Note that talking politics correlates strongly
with political interest ðPearson’s r 5 .56Þ without posing multicollinearity
problems. The substantial effect of talking politics thus comes on top of the
ðnonsigniﬁcantÞ effect of political interest; it is a pure “talking” effect.
Hypothesis 4 stated that because of better information, lower cost, more
leverage, and more opportunity, potential participants mostly invite strong
tie relations to join them in protest participation ðprivatizationÞ. Of all kinds
of people the respondents could mark as having invited, two types stand out
as typical cases of strong ties: partner/family and friends. The data in ﬁgure 1
substantiate that prospective participants indeed most frequently invite
partner/family and friends to join. Weak ties are invited less. Note that
people probably have fewer family members and fewer friends than ac-
quaintances and relatives. So, even though they have more weak ties than
strong ties, they tend to solicit more frequently people with whom they hold
strong ties. Fifteen paired t-tests further conﬁrm hypothesis 4: all pairs
differ signiﬁcantly, with inner circle participation requests occurring most
frequently.
Hypothesis 5 held that, because of the compatibility of their social circles,
participants tend to pass on invitations to similar kinds of people they were
invited by ðmirroringÞ. Being asked by friends leads to asking friends, being
FIG. 1.—Percentage of respondents asking different types of others ðN 5 7,490Þ;
multiple response.
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asked by relatives leads to asking relatives, and so forth. To test this hy-
pothesis, in table 3, we present a summary of a series of seven multilevel
binomial regressions each time predicting whether a certain type of recruit
ðpartner/family, friend, colleague/fellow student, etc.Þwas asked ðno/yesÞ. In
each model all potential askers were incorporated as dummy variables to-
gether with all other motivation, capacity, and control variables.
The evidence supports the hypothesis. In each model the strongest pre-
dictor of having asked a speciﬁc category of recruits is having been asked
by someone in that same category of recruiters. So, the ﬁrst line in table 3
reports about a single independent variable drawn from a full regression
model with asked no one as the dependent variable ðno/yesÞ. The strongest
predictor in that model with all motivation, capacity, control, and alterna-
tive asked variables included was whether that person ðwho asked no oneÞ
was asked by no one in the ﬁrst place; in that model the coefﬁcient for being
asked by no one is 1.433 with a .108 SE. This is the strongest explanatory
variable in the model of which the other variables are not reported. Hence,
the ﬁrst model conﬁrms the mirroring mechanism for no one ðyes in the ﬁrst
columnÞ. People who were asked by no one tend to ask no one themselves,
people who are asked by acquaintances do tend to ask acquaintances them-
selves, and so forth. There is only one exception to this overall pattern: pro-
spective participants asking their partner or family members have not pri-
marily been asked by their partner/family but by acquaintances. The reason
may simply be that people who are asked by their spouse cannot ask their
spouse in turn; the nuclear family simply is too small to pass on information.
That being asked by acquaintances predicts asking partner/family is another
indicator of the privatization tendency discussed above whereby people tend
to pass on the information acquired from “strangers” to their primary others.
TABLE 3
Summary Table of Seven Multilevel Logistic Regressions:
Effect of Being Asked on Asking Others
Asked Mirror? Coeff. SE z-Value P
Strongest Predicting
Asked By Variable
No one . . . . . . . . . . Yes 1.433 .108 13.29 .000 No one
Partner/family . . . . . No 2.044 .084 2.52 .604 Acquaintances
Friends . . . . . . . . . . Yes 1.462 .136 10.77 .000 Friends
Relatives . . . . . . . . . Yes .835 .075 11.09 .000 Relatives
Colleagues/fellow
students . . . . . . . . Yes 1.482 .115 12.84 .000
Colleagues/fellow
students
Acquaintances . . . . . Yes 1.099 .093 11.87 .000 Acquaintances
Comembers . . . . . . . Yes .959 .088 10.89 .000 Comembers
NOTE.—N demonstrators 5 7,490; N demonstrations 5 48.
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By and large, hypothesis 5 is corroborated: there is a robust mirroring mech-
anism at work.
Hypothesis 6, ﬁnally, stated that by whom people are asked to partici-
pate affects their own recruitment intensity/diversity. The stronger the tie
through which they are activated, the fewer other different people they
tend to solicit ðdeactivationÞ. The reason for expecting this effect was the
tendency to stop recruiting once one has close tie company and the fact that
intimate information from strong ties is more difﬁcult to pass on to sec-
ondary relations than vice versa. We turn again to table 2, more concretely,
to model 3. The data support the expectation. Being asked by a strong tie
is a signiﬁcant, negative predictor of recruitment intensity/diversity. In-
versely, if people are asked by someone they do not know very well ðweak
tieÞ, the probability increases that they will ask many other ðkinds ofÞ
people to participate. Hypothesis 6 gets conﬁrmation.
Since this last ﬁnding represents the most exciting result, it requires some
more robustness checking. In fact, there is a plausible alternative expla-
nation for the ﬁnding that strong tie recruitment leads to less subsequent
recruitment by the recruited. Instead of deactivation by strong tie recruit-
ment, there may be several, positive weak tie selection effects at work
here. This alternative explanation basically argues that the negative strong
tie effect we theorized here actually is a positive weak tie selection effect.
First, the initial weak tie recruiter may have selected recruits who are more
motivated to extend his or her recruitment effort. In fact, we know that
recruiters act as rational prospectors carefully aiming their recruitment
efforts at those who are most likely to participate ðBrady et al. 1999Þ.
Potential recruits may send out some kind of “signal” that they are will-
ing to participate, and this signal may be picked up by the recruiter, who
prioritizes recruitment of these most willing recruits ðwho will start re-
cruiting themselves afterwardÞ. Second, and similarly, the tie strength ef-
fect may actually be based on the fact that a good deal of the weak ties are
ties to comembers of organizations. Rather than being a true tie effect, the
fact that one is asked by comembers of an organization may indicate that
one is part of the organizational circle of a protest event and thus, again, is
more motivated to recruit others. Being part of the organizational circle
leads not only to more motivation but also to more capacity to recruit.
People who are asked by weak ties ðespecially those asked by comember
weak tiesÞ simply know more prospective participants than people asked
by strong ties: they have more capacity to recruit. Third, it may be the case
that someone is asked by a weak tie relationship simply because one has a
larger network with more weak ties while someone who is being asked by a
strong tie relationship typically has a smaller network. When this person
starts recruiting himself, he has more potential recruits in his network
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simply because his personal network is larger. Although we can partially
control for some of these selection effects, we cannot deﬁnitely discard
them.
To some extent, the alternative explanation stating thatwhatwe ﬁnd is the
consequence of higher motivation among the ones who have been recruited
via weak ties can be countered by looking at the evidence. In fact, the tie
strength effect in model 3 in table 2 comes on top of three motivational
measures. Of course, itmay be that somemotivational factors are not entirely
soaked up by the motivational measures, so that it appears that there is a tie
strength effect, although it is actually a motivational effect. Moreover, the tie
strength effect we ﬁnd also comes on top of the effect of three organizational
measures ðsee also model 3 in table 2Þ. This makes it unlikely that the results
are driven by the fact that being mobilized by organization members makes
it more probable that one belongs to the organizational circle with more
motivation and capacity as a result. With the data at hand, though, it is not
possible to discard the third alternative explanation claiming that the tie
strength effect is an indicator of a person’s network size, with weak tie re-
cruitment indicating a larger personal network. We would need much more
detailed personal network data about the respondents in our sample to con-
trol for this third possible selection effect.4
To deal further with these worries beyond inserting controls in the model,
we estimated a slightly differently speciﬁed model, this time not drawing on
the single tie strength scale but using a set of dummy variables each rep-
resenting a separate step on the scale and with the weakest tie category
ðcomembers/acquaintancesÞ as the reference category. Such a model allows
us to test whether the found effect is linear across the scale and not merely an
artifact of the extreme ðand largeÞ category of participants asked by co-
members. Results are recorded in table 4.
The series of dummies clearly displays a gradually decreasing effect as ties
become stronger. Compared to the weakest tie ðcomembers/acquaintancesÞ,
all ties result in signiﬁcantly less active recruitment. Even people recruited
by their partner/family do recruit signiﬁcantly fewer others than when re-
cruited by their friends. As ties become stronger, the negative effect progres-
sively increases ðthe coefﬁcient goes from 2.232 over 2.296 and 2.408 to
2.601Þ. All this suggests that the tie effect probably is not just a selection
effect of organizational capacity and motivation. In fact, if we disaggregate
4Although these robustness checks add weight to our deactivation mechanism, a ﬁnal
selection argument would be that individuals who are recruited by weak ties and who
are active recruiters themselves are more likely to participate ðsince they found suitable
companyÞ. This selection effect would bias the sample of participants. We cannot def-
initely discard this argument as we rely only on participant data here. Future research
including nonparticipants may address this issue.
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the scale further and split up comembers and acquaintances and insert them
in a similar model, we see that people recruited by acquaintances are the
single-most active recruiters, even more than those mobilized by comembers
ðresults not shown in the tableÞ.
The evidence thus supports that strong tie recruitment leads to fewer
recruitment efforts by the recruited. But is the difference between strong
and weak tie recruitment substantial? What does it mean in the real world
of protest mobilization? To assess that, we ran simulations based on the
coefﬁcients of model 3 in table 2 comparing the total number of people
reached and the number of “rounds of asking” when departing from 100
people asking their strong or weak ties. The key assumption in the simu-
lation is that being asked by strong ties is as effective ðconvinces as many
people to participateÞ as being asked by weak ties—something social move-
ment scholars do not agree about ðsee aboveÞ. To make things easy, we ac-
cept that half of the people who are asked by any tie do decide to participate
TABLE 4
Multilevel Regression: Recruitment Intensity/Diversity the Dependent
Variable, with Tie Strength Dummies
Coeff. SE P
Motivation:
Motivational strength ðweak-strong; 1–5Þ . . . . . . . . . . .279 .028 .000
Participation decision timing ðlate-early; 1–4Þ . . . . . . . .246 .024 .000
Organizing SMO identiﬁcation ðlow-high; 1–5Þ . . . . . . .018 .022 .412
Capacity:
Association membership ðweighed number; 0–26Þ . . . . .045 .007 .000
Organizational involvement ðfrequency; 0–4Þ . . . . . . . .057 .026 .029
Talking politics ðfrequency; 1–5Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 .029 .000
Being asked by:* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Relatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.232 .094 .013
Colleagues/fellow students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.296 .068 .000
Friends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.408 .058 .000
Partner/family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.601 .065 .000
Sociodemographics:
Sex ðfemaleÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .063 .040 .116
Age ðyear bornÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .019 .001 .000
Education ðlow-high; 1–8Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .045 .013 .001
Employment ðfull-time; no-yesÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.031 .040 .438
Controls:
Organizing SMO membership ðno-yesÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . .058 .049 .234
Demonstration participation frequency ðlow-high; 1–5Þ . . . .095 .032 .003
Political interest ðlow-high; 1–4Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.042 .035 .223
Left/right self-placement ðleft-right; 0–10Þ . . . . . . . . . . 2.024 .011 .029
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238.598 2.708 .000
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,261.4939
NOTE.—N demonstrations 5 48; N demonstrators 5 4,417; log likelihood null model 5
27,782.4886.
* The reference category is comembers/acquaintances.
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and, in function of the strength of the tie they have been asked by, start
asking other ties. Note that we ignore the fact that recruitment can go on
only till the event actually takes place. In reality, of the 100 people being
asked, some are asked the day before the event, and they lack time to ask
others. All these limitations apply to all tie categories; our goal is to compare
the magnitude of the effect of asking others across the different tie catego-
ries. The results reveal that the number of people recruited and the rounds
of asking done vary substantially. We take the extreme categories on the
strong-weak tie scale as examples. Departing from 100 people who recruit
their family, eight rounds of asking are done before recruitment activity
peters out ði.e., fewer than one additional participant joinsÞ and 222 people
eventually show up at the demonstration. If we start with 100 people who
recruit acquaintances or comembers, the diffusion of recruitment goes a
good deal further: only after 27 rounds of asking, nomore recruitment efforts
are undertaken and no fewer than 621 people show up. In other words, on
the basis of a similar number of people who ask their strongest or weakest
ties, almost three times as many people are recruited when the ﬁrst round of
asking aimed for weak ties compared to when the ﬁrst round was aimed at
strong ties. All other categories of tie strength score in between. Figure 2
presents the results.
A ﬁnal robustness check for all results entails running separate models
for the different demonstration issues represented in our sample of dem-
onstrations. Although we used multilevel modeling to account for the
fact that the observations are clustered on the demonstration level, it may
still be the case that our ﬁndings remain conﬁned to some demonstrations
on some issues or are generated by the large size of the data set. Therefore,
we ran the original model ðwith the tie strength scale variableÞ separately
for each of the four issues for which we have at least six demonstrations in
the data set ðausterity, May Day, climate, and state reformÞ. Table 5 pre-
sents the results.
Results show that as good as all effects found in the aggregate, large N
models are robust and hold across issues when tested in separate models
with much smaller N’s. In each separate issue model, at least two of the
three motivational measures are signiﬁcant ðhypothesis 1Þ. Participation
decision timing consistently is a signiﬁcant predictor of recruitment in-
tensity/diversity. More or less the same applies to the three capacity mea-
sures ðhypotheses 2 and 3Þ, but the differences across issues are larger.
None of the capacity measures is signiﬁcant across the board, but with the
exception of the climate issue model, at least two capacity measures are sig-
niﬁcant in each model. Tie strength matters consistently across the board for
each issue ðhypothesis 6Þ. For all issues, strong tie invitations lead to less ac-
tive recruitment.
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FIG. 2.—Effect of starting with 100 recruiters recruited by each of the tie categories: simulation
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TABLE 5
Multilevel Regression: Recruitment Intensity/Diversity the Dependent Variable; Separate Models for Issues
AUSTERITY MAY DAY CLIMATE STATE REFORM
Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE P
Motivation:
Motivational strength ðweak-strong; 1–5Þ . . . . . . . . . . .278 .048 .000 .140 .077 .067 .271 .059 .000 .376 .069 .000
Participation decision timing ðlate-early; 1–4Þ . . . . . . . .274 .041 .000 .239 .058 .000 .232 .051 .000 .266 .072 .000
Organizing SMO identiﬁcation ðlow-high; 1–5Þ . . . . . . .019 .034 .577 .116 .057 .042 2.031 .048 .518 .017 .056 .761
Capacity:
Associational membership ðweighed number; 0–26Þ . . . . . . .010 .011 .363 .089 .018 .000 .043 .018 .016 .088 .022 .000
Organizational involvement ðfrequency; 0–4Þ . . . . . . . .128 .040 .001 .040 .064 .532 .004 .060 .946 2.044 .070 .523
Talking politics ðfrequency; 1–5Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 .047 .027 .268 .073 .000 2.011 .064 .865 .168 .076 .027
Being asked:
Asked by . . . . . tie strength ðweak-strong; 1–5Þ . . . . . 2.170 .025 .000 2.136 .035 .000 2.134 .029 .000 2.156 .035 .000
Sociodemographics:
Sex ðfemaleÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 .064 .067 .039 .101 .700 .079 .086 .360 2.038 .105 .717
Age ðyear bornÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .020 .003 .000 .019 .003 .000 .021 .003 .000 .019 .003 .000
Education ðlow-high; 1–8Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .020 .022 .364 .014 .032 .666 .067 .031 .030 .068 .035 .053
Employment ðfull-time; no-yesÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .014 .068 .831 .033 .098 .739 2.087 .091 .341 2.029 .102 .780
Controls:
Organizing SMO membership ðno-yesÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.023 .083 .786 2.089 .125 .479 .092 .099 .351 .191 .132 .148
Demonstration participation frequency ðlow-high; 1–5Þ . . . .172 .052 .001 .112 .074 .133 .099 .071 .168 2.097 .097 .319
Political interest ðlow-high; 1–4Þ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.027 .052 .604 2.164 .100 .102 .027 .078 .730 2.119 .091 .191
Left/right self-placement ðleft-right; 0–10Þ . . . . . . . . . . 2.019 .016 .243 2.042 .036 .239 2.062 .027 .019 2.018 .027 .501
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240.916 5.039 .000 238.403 6.594 .000 242.472 5.475 .000 240.304 6.683 .000
N demonstrators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,605 706 991 650
N demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11 7 6
Log likelihood null model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,733.136 21,267.563 21,769.425 21,162.231
Log likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,583.435 21,198.609 21,693.565 21,099.948
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To wrap up, our claim that the diffusion of protest via asking others is
determined by the motivation of the recruiters, by their capacity to invite
others, and by whom they themselves were asked holds water. All hy-
potheses received support. Protest spreads in networks via asking others—
the ﬂip side of being asked—and this asking others is patterned and does
not occur randomly. Motivation, capacity, and compatibility lead to a
process in which we observe three diffusion mechanisms: people ask their
primary contacts to take part ðprivatizationÞ, they tend to ask the same
type of people that they were asked by ðmirroringÞ, and they tend to for-
ward strong tie invitations to fewer contacts numerically and to less di-
verse contacts ðdeactivationÞ. The three diffusion mechanisms of privat-
ization, mirroring, and deactivation are taking place at the same time. The
overall picture shows that protest diffusion mostly occurs in participants’
primary circles. Recruitment appeals are typically processed and for-
warded to people closer in one’s interpersonal network. Activating mes-
sages are not often “externalized” to people who are more distant and with
whom one has a weaker tie than with the person one got the invitation
from. But if it happens, the consequences are large as those recruits will be
more active recruiters themselves.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Students of social movements overwhelmingly agree that being asked is an
important precursor of actual participation. Yet there is simply no em-
pirical work dealing with asking others. Our primary aim was to ﬁll that
void and to shift the focus to the asking part of protest diffusion. Being
asked is only half of the story. Not only are prospective participants re-
cruited; they also recruit others in turn. If not, mobilization would die out
rapidly and large protests would be rare. The diffusion of protest requires
both receivers and senders of mobilizing calls. This study examined the
determinants and patterns of asking others using novel evidence about the
recruitment behavior of more than 7,000 participants in 48 protest dem-
onstrations across Europe. All the ﬁndings held for different issues increas-
ing the chance that they highlight a general pattern.
In a nutshell, recruitment happens by participants who are strongly
motivated and by participants who have the network capacity to recruit.
Recruiting activists tend to ask especially their strong tie relationships to
join them in protest. These three ﬁndings appear to be logical and not very
surprising. Even if no other social movement studies have empirically
examined recruiting behavior, they are in line with what can be expected
from the existing body of studies on being recruited.
The study’s most interesting ﬁnding is that by whom people are asked has
a strong and consistent effect on whom they ask themselves. We discovered
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two mechanisms linking being asked with asking others. First, activists tend
to ask the same kind of people they were asked by. We called this the mir-
roring mechanism. Second, activists receiving strong tie invitations tend to
become less active recruiters themselves. This is the deactivation mechan-
ism. In other words, and inversely, activists who are being asked by someone
with whom they hold weak ties—they do not know this person really well
ðacquaintanceÞ or they have met this person through an organization—tend
to be more intense recruiters; they ask a broader group of other people to
join.
These are intriguing and novel ﬁndings. They are original with regard
not only to the speciﬁc literature on protest diffusion but to social diffusion
studies more generally. Our best interpretation of the mirroring and de-
activation mechanisms is that recruiters mostly address people who so-
cially match their own recruiters. Since participating in a protest demon-
stration is a social activity and recruits and recruiters tend to show up in
each other’s company, following the homophily thesis, it is natural that
recruiters pick out their potential recruits so that they would be similar to
the ones who recruited them in the ﬁrst place. Added to that, we argued
that factual and less intimate information typically coming from weak ties
can more easily be passed on to many different ties ðboth other weak and
strongÞ than vice versa. We are aware of the fact that there may be al-
ternative explanations for the deactivation mechanism. It cannot be ex-
cluded that we are actually looking at a selection effect. We controlled for
a battery of motivational and capacity measures and ran separate dis-
aggregated analyses that reduce the chance that the effect actually is the
consequence of selection and not of deactivation. What we especially lack
is better measures of the wider personal network of both the recruiters and
the recruits, related to both their political and nonpolitical activities. This
would allow us to test for the effect of the size of one’s network and of the
prevalence of speciﬁc types of ties in personal networks. Such data are
difﬁcult to collect but would be extremely welcome to fully tease out the
mechanism underlying what we found here. Even if what we found would
be largely due to a selection effect, the fact remains that strong tie and
weak tie recruitment have strikingly different consequences.
Our ﬁndings complement a good deal of previous social movement work
showing that being asked by a strong tie relation increases the chances of
one’s own participation more than being asked by a weak tie relation.
Although it may not be so effective in convincing people to take part, we
showed that weak tie interpersonal recruitment is crucial to the success of
a mobilization campaign: the simulation showed that it stimulates the wider
spread of participation invitations across and through micro networks.
This puts in perspective the limited effect of organizational mobilization
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found in previous work. Organizations are effective because their members
amplify the call for participation more broadly and beyond truncated net-
works so that more people are eventually reached. Our evidence pleads for
more attention to the double role organizations play in mobilization. On
the one hand, they mobilize their weak tie members. On the other hand, or-
ganization members act as informal marketers and recruiters in their in-
terpersonal networks. Our evidence suggests that this second role may be
of substantial importance. If mobilization occurs completely outside of or-
ganizations and within strong tie networks, it reaches out less far.This is the
case not only because organizations have many members in many different
interpersonal networks but because the asking process in a weak tie context
itself generates more recruitment spin-offs. It generates larger “micro waves”
of recruitment than strong tie recruitment.
Taken together, our ﬁndings lead to what looks like a paradox of re-
cruitment in networks. Asking others with whom a recruiter shares close
ties is maybe more effective than asking weak tie relations because the
chance is larger that the target decides to join ðthis is what most extant
work on being asked has foundÞ. Yet, at the same time, asking others with
whom one has weak ties, although with a smaller chance of being success-
ful, leads if successful ðthe recruit decides to joinÞ to a potentially larger
ripple effect because the recruit will most likely turn out to be a more ac-
tive recruiter himself, extending the mobilizing message to more different
others ðthis is what this study on asking others addedÞ. In sum, our evi-
dence conﬁrms Granovetter’s ð1973, 1978Þ idea that weak ties are primary
sources for diffusion ðsee also Centola and Macy 2007Þ.
These results speak not only to social movement scholarship but to the
ﬁeld of social diffusion more generally. Very little diffusion research exam-
ines whether how and via whom a behavior is adopted has a bearing on to
whom that behavior is passed on. In fact, most of the time, once a behavior
is adopted, it does not matter any longer through whom one was affected.
Compare it with the spread of a disease or the adoption of a new technol-
ogy. Once sick or using the technology, one is “contagious” irrespective of
from whom one picked up the disease or the technology in the ﬁrst place
ðCentola and Macy 2007Þ. Mirroring and deactivation suggest that this tru-
ism does not apply to interpersonal recruitment. There is a memory in re-
cruitment. In recruitment, people act as conscious and deliberate nodes in a
network; they display agency. Information and requests are just passed on
not to everyone but mostly to those who match the one who asked the re-
cruiter before. The main difference is that recruitment for protest and for
other forms of collective activity entails that the recruiter invites the recruit
to a joint activity. Recruitment is socially consequential as, if successful, one
spends time with his recruit and with his recruiter. Our ﬁndings about mir-
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roring and deactivation may be more widely applicable to diffusion pro-
cesses of joint activities or of time spent together.
The study has a number of weaknesses. First, it draws only on partici-
pants, not comparing participants with nonparticipants. Although, most
likely, the bulk of the asking is done by people planning to participate, it
may be that some people ask others while not attending themselves. These
nonattending askers were not in our sample. It is hard to say to what de-
gree the results are affected by this bias. It may be the case that the non-
attending askers are less motivated ðwhich is why they do not show up
eventuallyÞ. It may be the case that they have, on average, less information
about other potential participants ðso that their recruitment efforts failmore
often and they more frequently decide not to participate themselves after
allÞ. To tease this out, future studies may try to include nonparticipants in
the design; but the major drawback is that the number of recruiters among
the nonparticipants will be exceedingly small.
Second, the study had no information regarding the channels through
which people were invited or invited others. The current proliferation of
digital channels and social online networks most likely affects the amount,
target, and effect of asking others. A message on a Facebook page is less
consequential while targeting many more people than a face-to-face con-
versation, which may be more compelling but at the same time more de-
manding. In other words, asking others can take many forms and happen
via different media, and it would be interesting to take that into account in
future studies ðsee, e.g., Fisher and Boekkooi 2010Þ. The fact that we found
that younger people are systematically more active in recruiting others may
be due to their stronger online presence and digital network activity.
Third, we dealt with only one type of protest: taking part in peaceful
demonstrations in a nonthreatening context ðestablished European democ-
raciesÞ. Other sorts of social movement activities ðe.g., direct actionÞ in
other contexts ðe.g., under authoritarian regimesÞ may be characterized by
different recruitment patterns. The literature provides a few examples of
how different types of political participation are differently affected by
being asked ðVerba et al. 1995; Lim 2008, 2010Þ. We expect that the same
factors—motivation, capacity, and ties—will be playing a role for asking
others in other cases and contexts as well. Yet their relative weight may be
affected by speciﬁc circumstances. For instance, motivation and strong ties
may be more important when actions are costly, risky, and controversial. If
more social support is needed, then weak ties do not sufﬁce ðCentola and
Macy 2007Þ.
Our goal was to push forward the debate on protest in particular and
diffusion in general by incorporating the ﬂip side of the well-examined
“being asked” aspect of diffusion and recruitment. Future research could
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address similar questions in a variety of protest and nonprotest contexts to
establish whether the mechanisms of privatization, mirroring, and deac-
tivation are typical for large-scale, peaceful protest marches or can be
applied instead to a variety of social activities. We expect them to apply to
many activities in which people invite others to participate in their com-
pany.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Surveyed Demonstrations, 2009–11
Demonstration Country Issue
N
Demonstrators
N Distributed
Questionnaires
N Sent Back
Questionnaires
N in
Analyses
TUC’s March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice ðLondonÞ . . . U.K. Austerity 250,000 993 214 120
1 Mei Mars ðAntwerpÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Belg. May Day 2,000 837 216 165
1st May, Labor Day ðBarcelonaÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spain May Day 8,000 700 180 142
Against Labor Law ðMadridÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spain Austerity 10,000 780 308 266
Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis, and War ðBarcelonaÞ . . . . . . . . Spain Austerity 1,500 300 77 60
Antinuclear demonstration ðStockholmÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sweden Climate 1,000 718 283 210
Beat the Heat ðUtrechtÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Climate 3,500 662 270 216
Celebration May Day ðVigoÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spain May Day 15,000 263 66 48
Climate Change ðBrusselsÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Belg. Climate 15,000 777 334 268
Climate March ðCopenhagenÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Den. Climate 65,000 789 242 191
Demonstration against Abortion ðMadridÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spain Abortion 15,000 871 302 204
Demonstration against language decree ðSantiago de CompostelaÞ . . . . Spain State reform 40,000 1,000 324 254
Demonstration against the new labor law ðSantiago de CompostelaÞ . . . . Spain Austerity 10,000 780 168 143
Euromayday ðMilanÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Italy May Day 5,000 993 126 92
For employment, not capital reforms: Defend Our Rights ðVigoÞ . . . . . Spain Austerity 2,000 340 168 140
Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Austerity 30,000 995 147 109
General Strike ðFlorenceÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Italy Austerity 15,000 987 234 164
Knowledge crisis ðDen HaagÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Austerity 15,000 943 280 214
March for Work ðBrusselsÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Belg. Austerity 30,000 466 129 104
Marcia Perugia-Assisi ðAssisiÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Italy Austerity 150,000 1,000 264 185
May 1 March, Left Party ðStockholmÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sweden May Day 4,200 430 167 146
May 1 March, Social Democratic Party ðStockholmÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sweden May Day 3,000 429 176 141
May 1st Demonstration ðZurichÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Switz. May Day 8,000 861 135 103
May Day ðFlorenceÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Italy May Day 500 408 110 71
May Day ðLeft PartyÞ ðMalmöÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sweden May Day 2,000 388 142 124
May Day ðSAP/LOÞ ðMalmöÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sweden May Day 900 281 97 81
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Demon-
stration Country Issue
N
Demonstrators
N Distributed
Questionnaires
N Sent
Back
Ques-
tion-
naires
May Day Labor March ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. May Day 5,000 977 178 115
Million Women Rise ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Women 3,000 973 178 106
National Climate March ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Climate 50,000 606 243 166
National Climate March 2010 ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Climate 1,500 966 360 239
NL cries out for culture ðAmsterdamÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Austerity 15,000 353 174 86
NL cries out for culture ðUtrechtÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Austerity 2,500 385 171 56
No Government, Great Country ðBrusselsÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Belg. State reform 45,000 717 365 239
No to Austerity ðBrusselsÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Belg. Austerity 70,000 767 144 77
No to Hate Crime Vigil ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Antiracism 2,000 993 169 100
Nonproﬁt Demonstration ðBrusselsÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Belg. Austerity 15,000 634 200 140
Not in Our Name ðBrusselsÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Belg. State reform 700 619 202 149
Pension demonstration ðRotterdamÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Austerity 7,000 676 294 216
Real Democracy Now! ðMadridÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spain Austerity 25,000 776 350 214
Strong together for public employment ðDen HaagÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Austerity 8,000 1,000 339 207
Enough of nuclear energy ðAmsterdamÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Climate 2,500 855 388 304
Second Student National Demo ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Austerity 20,000 1,000 98 46
Self-determination is democracy ðBarcelonaÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spain State reform 10,000 655 301 223
Stop racism and exclusion ðAmsterdamÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neth. Antiracism 387 387 124 98
Take Back Parliament ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. State reform 2,000 991 351 254
Unite Against Fascism National Demo ðLondonÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.K. Antiracism 3,000 992 189 147
We are a nation, we decide ðBarcelonaÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spain State reform 1,000,000 980 309 226
World March of Women ðBernÞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Switz. Women 6,000 420 150 121
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,436 7,490
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TABLE A2
Sociodemographics, Control, Motivation, and Capacity Variables ðN 5 4,417Þ
Variable Question Wording Answer Categories Mean SD
Sociodemographics:
Sex Are you . . . ? 1. Male
2. Female
1.493 .500
Age In which year were you born? Year 1967.7 15.4
Employment What is your employment situation? I work
full-time ðincluding maternity leave or other
temporary absenceÞ
0. No
1. Yes
.446 .497
Education What is the highest level of education that you
completed?
If you are a student, at what level are you
studying?
1. None, did not complete primary
education
2. Primary or ﬁrst stage of basic
3. Lower secondary or second stage of
basic
4. Upper secondary
5. Postsecondary, nontertiary
6. First stage of tertiary
7. Second stage of tertiary
8. Posttertiary ðPhDÞ
5.894 1.518
Control variables:
Organizing SMO membership Please list the main organizations staging this
demonstration. Are you a member of any of
these organizations?
1. No/don’t know/not sure
2. Yes
1.516 .499
Demonstration participation
frequency
How many times have you in the past taken part
in a demonstration, during the last 12 months?
1. Never
2. 1–5 times
3. 6–10 times
4. 11–20 times
5. 211 times
1.950 .712
Left-right self-placement In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right.”
Where would you place yourself on this scale,
where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?
Scale 0–10, left-right 2.565 2.067
Political interest How interested are you in politics? 1. Not at all
2. Not very
3. Quite
4. Very
3.292 .707
Motivation variables:
Motivational strength How determined were you to participate in the
demonstration?
1. Not very
2. Rather
3. Somewhat
4. Quite
5. Very much
4.422 .801
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Variable Question Wording
Answer
Cate-
gories
Mea-
n
Participation decision timing When did you make a ﬁrm decision to participate
in the demonstration?
1. The day of the demonstration
2. A few days before the demonstration
3. A few weeks before the demonstration
4. Over a month ago
2.873 .968
Organizing SMO identiﬁcation To what extent do you identify with any organization
staging the demonstration?
1. Not at all
2. Not very much
3. Somewhat
4. Quite
5. Very much
3.860 1.046
Capacity variables:
Associational membership If you have been involved in any of the following types
of organizations in the past 12 months, please
indicate whether you are a passive member or an
active member? If you are a member of several
organizations of the same type, tick the highest or
most “active” category.
1. Church or religious organization
2. Trade union or professional
association
3. Political party
4. Women’s organization
5. Sport or cultural organization
6. Environmental organization
7. Lesbian or gay rights organization
8. Community or neighborhood
association
9. Charity or welfare organization
10. Third-world, global justice or
peace organization
11. Antiracist or migrant organization
12. Human or civil rights organization
13. Other*
4.057 3.176
Organizational involvement During the last 12 months, in how many different
organizations have you actively participated?
1. None
2. 1
3. Between 2 and 3
4. More than 3
2.378 .965
Talking politics When you get together with your friends, relatives, or
fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics?
1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Fairly often
5. Very often
3.766 .823
* Other is an additive scale of all memberships whereby passive ðand ﬁnancialÞ membership counts for 1 and active membership counts for 2; scale 0–26.
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TABLE A3
Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Regressions ðN 5 4,417Þ
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Recruitment intensity/diversity 1
2. Motivational strength .285 1
3. Participation decision timing .286 .473 1
4. Organizing SMO identiﬁcation .127 .337 .254 1
5. Association membership .178 .112 .163 .218 1
6. Organizational involvement .181 .153 .209 .254 .585 1
7. Talking politics .166 .145 .152 .164 .174 .194 1
8. Asked by . . . tie strength .232 .212 .258 .270 .229 .316 .075 1
9. Sex .034 .040 2.004 2.047 2.012 2.058 2.015 2.094 1
10. Age .153 2.111 2.129 2.223 2.143 2.116 2.041 2.114 .099 1
11. Education .068 2.089 2.072 2.089 .024 .000 .129 2.110 .095 .104 1
12. Employment 2.018 .029 .048 .054 .009 2.010 2.028 .029 2.114 2.064 .007 1
13. Organizing SMO membership .095 .202 .256 .408 .230 .260 .034 .419 2.100 2.244 2.191 .101 1
14. Demonstration participation
frequency .177 .167 .205 .181 .215 .295 .289 .199 2.031 2.020 2.008 .042 .126 1
15. Political interest .132 .152 .163 .239 .217 .255 .560 .154 2.112 2.047 .117 2.046 .107 .233 1
16. Left /right self-placement 2.117 2.119 2.118 2.104 2.093 2.120 2.255 2.057 2.059 2.013 2.041 .016 2.060 2.298 2.268 1
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